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AT WAR WITH THE FERES DOCTRINE: THE
CARMELO RODRIGUEZ MILITARY MEDICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2009
Melissa Feldmeier+

"We don't promise you a rose garden."I
A plane crashes into a New York City skyscraper. A giant fireball surges
away from the wreck consuming those in its path, as large, sharp pieces of
metal and machinery careen through the offices inside. Flames and smoke
billow out of the building, to the dismay and horror of the New Yorkers below.
For most Americans today, and perhaps much of the world as well, the
indelible image of a fiery and smoke-filled Manhattan skyline brings to mind
the awful tragedy of September 11, 2001. But this was not that terrorist attack
on the World Trade Center. Rather, it was a densely foggy and rainy July 28,
1945, when a B-25 bomber, transporting servicemen from Bedford,
Massachusetts, to Newark, New Jersey, crashed into the seventy-ninth floor of
the Empire State Building. 2 The pilot, highly decorated Army Lieutenant
Colonel William F. Smith, Jr., was a combat veteran of World War II.3 He lost
visibility in the fog and the ensuing accident occurred, killing him, two other

+ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2003, University of San Diego. Prior to commencing law school, the author served in the
United States Navy as a Surface Warfare Officer (Nuclear) for five years, culminating her
military career as a lieutenant aboard USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76). She would like to thank
Commander Johnny Nilsen, JAGC, USN, for helping her begin her legal career, and Professor
Michael Noone for his candid and thoughtful feedback. The author would also like to thank the
staff members of the Catholic University Law Review for all of their hard work. This Comment is
dedicated to Howard and Susan Feldmeier, with love, and to the men and women of the Armed
Forces of the United States, with respect and appreciation for their service.
1. United States Marine Corps recruiting poster, available at http://www.grose.us/
pics/taliano.jpg (last visited Sept. 27, 2010); see Jennifer Brofer, We Don't Promise You a Rose
Garden (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.grose.us/rosegarden/article.htm (noting that this poster was
part of a recruiting campaign that ran from 1971 to 1984).

2.

Joe Richman, The Day a Bomber Hit the Empire State Building, NPR (July 28, 2008),

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=92987873;

William Roberts, July 28,

1945-PlaneHits Building-Woman Survives 75-Story Fall, ELEVATOR WORLD (Mar. 1, 1996),

www.elevator-world.com/magazine/archive01/9603-002.htm (explaining that the Empire State
Building was the tallest building in the world at that time); Jennifer Rosenberg, The Plane that
Crashed into the Empire State Building, http://historyI900s.about.com/od/1940s/a/empirecrash.

htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
3. Roberts, supra note 2; Rosenberg, supra note 2. Lieutenant Colonel Smith was a
decorated World War II veteran who had flown over one hundred combat missions. Roberts,
supra note 2.
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military crewmen, and eleven civilians who worked inside the building.4 To
compensate the families of the victims, the United States government offered
money. Unwilling to accept the amount offered, some of the victims sued the
government.6
The lawsuit was the impetus for "landmark legislation" in the form of the
Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 (FTCA).7 In the FTCA, the United States
partially waived its sovereign immunity, thereby giving American citizens, for
the first time, the right to sue the federal government for "negligent or
wrongful act[s] or omission[s]." 9 Since its enactment, the FTCA has been an
important mechanism for allowing citizens to redress injuries caused by the
government and its employees.' 0
Over the years, the Supreme Court has decided many FTCA cases,' but not
all of those decisions have been as well-received as the Act itself.12 One
interpretation of the FTCA that has received "widespread, almost universal
criticism"' 3 is Feres v. United States, decided by the Court in 1950.14 The
Feres Court held that the FTCA bars active-duty members of the militay from
suing the government for injuries sustained incident to their service.' This
4. See Rosenberg, supra note 2; see also Roberts, supra note 2. Fortunately, the crash
occurred on a Saturday morning when there were many thousands fewer people in the building.
Roberts, supra note 2.
5. Richman, supra note 2.
6. Id
7. Id (explaining that the crash was the catalyst for the FTCA); see Federal Tort Claims
Act, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812, 842-47 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2671-2680 (2006)). The 1946 FTCA was originally codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 921, 922, 931-934,
941-946 (1940). In 1948, Congress made minor changes to the 1946 Act. It is this 1948 Act that
is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680.
8. See Paul F. Figley, Understanding the FederalTort Claims Act: A Different Metaphor,
44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1105, 1107-09 (2009) (providing a history of the sovereign

immunity doctrine and an overview of how redress worked before the FTCA).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
10. See Figley, supra note 8, at 1138 ("The FTCA succeeds at the task Congress set for it. It
generally waives the United States' sovereign immunity for the torts of federal employees and
provides an effective mechanism to resolve claims against the government administrativelyor ...
judicially."). But see Howard Ball, Federal Tort Claims Act, http://www.answers.com/topic
/federal-tort-claims-act (last visited Sept. 27, 2010) ("[T]he FTCA has not been a major benefit to
persons injured or killed because of negligent actions of federal employees.").
11. See, e.g., Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 215, 227 (2008); Molzof v.
United States, 502 U.S. 301, 303, 312 (1992); United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 290
(1952).
12.

See infra Part 1.

13. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)). According to
Justice Scalia, Feres v. United States "heartily deserves" its negative criticism. Id.
14. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Justice Robert H. Jackson delivered the
opinion of a unanimous Court. Id at 136.
15. Id. at 146.
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principle, known as the "Feres Doctrine," has been applied expansively and
consistently upheld in its sixty years of existence.16 For almost as long, critics
have condemned Feres as one of the most unjust and unprincipled decisions in
American jurisprudence.' 7
In applying the Feres Doctrine, courts have barred suits against the
government by servicemen and their families in vastly varying situations. For
instance, a widow could not sue for the death of her husband in a barracks fire
resulting from the negligent maintenance of a heating system.' Similarly, the
Court held that a widow could not sue for the death of her husband in a Coast
Guard helicopter crash where the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had
taken control of the helicopter's radar.19 The executor of a sailor's estate could
not sue for the sailor's death from falling off a pier on return to his ship,20 and
an off-duty marine could not sue for injuries received when he was run over on
base by an on-duty military policeman.21 The estates of sailors who drowned
while participating in a Navy-led rafting trip also were barred from suing,22 as
23
was the mother of an off-duty soldier who was murdered by a fellow soldier.
Under Feres jurisprudence, it is practically certain that the families of the
servicemen killed by the crash of the B-25 bomber into the Empire State
Building would have been unable to sue for Lieutenant Colonel Smith's
piloting error, though that error would have allowed the families of the
civilians killed in the same accident to recover.24
16.

See infra Part I.B.3.

17. See, e.g., Johnson, 481 U.S. at 700-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Costo v. United States,
248 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e apply the Feres doctrine here without relish. Nor are
we the first to reluctantly reach such a conclusion under the doctrine. . . . [W]e join the many
panels of this Court that have criticized the inequitable extension of this doctrine . . . ."); Jonathan
Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrineand the Retention ofSovereign Immunity in the Military
System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2, 71 (2003) ("Both academics and lower

courts have condemned the [Feres] doctrine as unfounded, unfair, and even un-American. . . . [It]
can be accurately described as one of the Supreme Court's most ill-conceived, inequitable, and
unjustifiable creations.").
18. Feres, 340 U.S. at 137, 146.
19. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 682-83, 692.
20. Morey v. United States, 903 F.2d 880, 881 (1st Cir. 1990).
21. Millang v. United States, 817 F.2d 533, 534-36 (9th Cir. 1987).
22. Costo, 248 F.3d at 869.
23. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 53, 59 (1985).
24. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (concluding that "the Government is not
liable under the [FTCA] for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006) (including United States
military personnel in the definition of "employee[s] of the government," and thus making their
actions subject to lawsuit). It is likely that the service members in the B-25 bomber were riding
in the plane "incident to their service." See, e.g., Feres, 340 U.S. at 137, 146 (holding that an
injury received by an active-duty serviceman in a barracks fire was incident to his service). In
determining whether the injury occurred incident to service, courts review the injured service
member's activities at the time of the injury, his duty status, and the place of the injury. See, e.g.,
Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1008, 1013-15 (5th Cir. 1980) (examining the nature of
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The Feres Doctrine also bars service members from suin for injuries arising
from the negligence of military medical personnel.
These medical
malpractice cases are as tragic as any that occur in the civilian world. A sailor,
for example, could not recover for a bungled fallopian tube surgery that left her
infertile, nor could an airman recover for a botched gallbladder removal
surgery that required partial amputation of both of his legs.27 Furthermore,
under Feres, a marine sergeant named Carmelo Rodriguez could not sue for
untreated skin cancer, even though military doctors observed and recorded the
potentially cancerous tumors on his body during numerous physicals over the
When Sergeant Rodriguez
course of eight years, yet never informed him.
died from skin cancer in November 2007, the Feres Doctrine barred his family
from suing the government for medical malpractice. 29
The Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009
(Rodriguez Act) proposes to allow members of the military to recover for
medical and dental malpractice lawsuits against the government for
Introduced in the House
non-combat related injuries or deaths.30
of Representatives as House Bill 1478 and in the Senate as Senate Bill
1347, the Act is the latest legislative attempt to partially overrule Feres.31
Over the years, members of Congress have proposed several nearly
identical bills, but all have failed to pass. 32 Thus, despite continuing

the activities, duty status, and location of injury for a service member who was killed in a
government vehicle on a military base). This test, generally applied using a totality-of-thecircumstances analysis, has garnered widely disparate results, even for similar cases. See, e.g.,
Costo, 248 F.3d at 867 ("Rather than seizing on any particular combination of factors, we have
focused on 'the totality of the circumstances.' . . . [W]e have reached the unhappy conclusion that
the cases applying the Feres doctrine are irreconcilable . . . ."); Major Deirdre G. Brou,
Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated Feres Doctrine, 192 MIL. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (2007).

The negative consequence, of course, is that the meaning of "incident to service" is amorphous in
Feres jurisprudence. Id. at 26-30.
25. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 137-38, 146.
26.

See Linda Greenhouse, On Allowing Soldiers to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1986, at

B12; see also 134 CONG. REC. 1597 (1988) (statement of Rep. Daniel Glickman) (summarizing
the negligent treatment rendered by the Navy hospital and criticizing the paltry compensation the
sailor received for being left infertile at a young age).
27.

See Mary McGuirt, Airman Loses Legs After Gall Bladder [sic] Surgery, ABC NEWS

(July 22, 2009), http://www.abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=8150409&page= 1.
28. Carmelo Rodriguez Military MedicalAccountability Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1478
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Ith

Cong. 119-21 (2009) [hereinafter Rodriguez Hearing] (statement of Ivette Rodriguez, sister of
Sergeant Carmelo Rodriguez).
29. Id at 121.
30. Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 1478, 11Ith
Cong. (2009); Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, S. 1347, 111th
Cong. (2009).
31. H.R. 1478; S. 1347; see infra Part 1.C.2.
32.

See infra Part 1.C.
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"widespread" 33 hostility toward the Feres Doctrine, Congress has not
legislatively overruled it.34 Whether the Rodriguez Act will meet the same fate
as its predecessors remains to be seen. 35
This Comment examines and analyzes the relative merits of the Rodriguez
Act and the Feres Doctrine. First, it provides a brief factual and historical
overview of the FTCA and discusses how it functions. Next, this Comment
reviews the history of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in applying the
FTCA to claims made by service members. It does so by examining Feres and
its progeny and the continued judicial justifications for upholding Feres as well
as, in contrast, those proposed for overturning it. Next, this Comment
introduces the legislative predecessors to the Rodriguez Act, and follows with
previous congressional arguments for and against the Feres Doctrine. Then, it
explores the ramifications of the Rodriguez Act's passage, and alternatively, of
its failure. Here, this Comment focuses on the technical deficiencies of the
Rodriguez Act as written. In the third part, this Comment rejects the
Rodriguez Act and presents two previously suggested but never adopted
alternative solutions to the Feres problem and then espouses one of the
solutions in an effort to create a workable remedy to the embattled doctrine.
This Comment concludes with an alternate legislative proposal that is more
practical and equitable than the Rodriguez Act.
I.

THE MARCH TO FERES AND BEYOND

A. A BriefOverview of the FTCA

The Founding Fathers adopted the English common law principle of
sovereign immunity, which holds that citizens may only sue the govemment
for that which the government has consented to be sued.36 Thus, "no action
33. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)).
34. See infra Part L.C.
35. As of August 27, 2010, S. 1347 had been referred to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary. 155 CONG. REC. S6993 (daily ed. June 24, 2009); see also Bill Summary & Status
111th Congress (2009-2010) S. 1347, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?dlll:SN01347: (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
H.R. 1478 was reported and
amended by the House Committee on the Judiciary and placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar
No. 267, on April 26, 2010. 155 CONG. REC. H2876 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2010); see also Bill
Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009-2010) I.R. 1478, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 11 :HRO1478:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Sept.
27, 2010).
36. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950) ("While the political theory that the
King could do no wrong was repudiated in America, a legal doctrine derived from it that the
Crown is immune from any suit to which it has not consented was invoked on behalf of the
Republic and applied by our courts as vigorously as it had been on behalf of the Crown."); see
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) ("It is inherent
in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual, without its consent.");
Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV.
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lies against the United States unless the legislature has authorized it."37 For
almost 150 years, a person injured by the federal government or its employees
One
had no remedy but to petition Congress for redress of his grievances.
can imagine the inherent inefficiency of this practice. 39 Indeed, complaints
about grievances overwhelming the congressional workload are as old as the
Republic. 40 Improvements came slowly, as Con ress passed legislation that
Tort claims against the
provided remedies for many of those claims.
government, however, were repeatedly excluded from these legislative
enactments.4 2 As this responsibility became increasingly burdensome on

1, 1 (1963). Nowhere is the rule of sovereign immunity invoked in the Constitution; however, it
is implied. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321 (1934) ("[T]here is no express
provision that the United States may not be sued in the absence of consent. . . . But by reason of
the established doctrine of the immunity of the sovereign from suit except upon consent, the
provision of Clause one of § 2 of Article III does not authorize the maintenance of suits against
the United States.").
37. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30 (1953).
38. The First Amendment of the Constitution states "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging ... the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The result of these petitions, if considered worthy, would be a private bill
granting special relief to the individual. 1 Handling Federal Tort Claims (MB) § 2.01, 2-5 to -6
(June 2010).
39. The Supreme Court noted that this process was "notoriously clumsy." Dalehite, 346
U.S. at 24-25. In some years, there were over 2000 private relief bills introduced before
Congress. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 154 (1963). "Because the claimants could
only seek relief through private legislation, it was not long before petitions for relief became so
numerous that Congress found itself under an intense and time-consuming burden of attempting
to adjudicate, to the detriment of its duty to legislate." 1 Handling Federal Tort Claims, supra
note 38, §2.02, at 2-6.
40. Figley, supra note 8, at 1108 ("John Quincy Adams complained about the inordinate
time Congress spent on claims matters. Millard Fillmore urged that a tribunal be established to
handle private claims. Abraham Lincoln called for such a change in his first annual message to
Congress." (internal citations omitted)).
41. Id. In 1855, Congress passed the Court of Claims Act. Court of Claims Act, ch. 122, 10
Stat. 612 (1855). This Act created an "administrative or advisory body" consisting of three
judges whose purpose was to "hear and determine certain claims against the government of the
United States, and also all claims which might be referred to the court by either House of
Congress." Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 562, 565 (1933). Though called a "court,"
the Court of Claims functioned only to prepare bills for congressional review. United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 144 (1871). It did little to relieve Congress of the heavy burden presented by
private claims. Even after Congress increased the number ofjudges and gave the court the power
to enter final judgments, appealable only to the Supreme Court, Court of Claims Act
Amendments of 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765 (1863), private claims bills continued to overload
Congress. 1 Handling Federal Tort Claims, supra note 38, § 2.04, at 2-14.
42. Figley, supra note 8, at 1108. Because the jurisdictional provisions of the Court of
Claims Act and its amendments did not seem to include tort claims, and because the Supreme
Court rejected any such interpretation, private bills for tort relief continued to burden Congress. 1
Handling Federal Tort Claims, supra note 38, §§ 2.03-.04, at 2-11 to -14. In 1887, Congress
passed the Tucker Act, which was originally a general tort claims act, but which the Senate
modified before passage to exclude tort claims. Id. § 2.04, at 2-16 to -17. This modified version
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congressional claims committees, "pressure grew for enactment of a
comprehensive law to more efficiently handle tort claims against the
government."43 In the twenty-five years before the FTCA was passed, over
thirty bills were proposed to address the problem.44 The 1945 crash of the B25 bomber in New York City provided a late surge of momentum for that
effort. 45
Congress finally passed the FTCA on August 2, 1946, allowing citizens to
file suit against the government for tort claims. 46 As the Feres Court noted,
"[t]he primary purpose of the [FTCA] was to extend a remedy to those who
had been without [one]."47 To file a claim against the government under the
FTCA, a person must first exhaust the requisite administrative remedies with
the appropriate federal agency.4 8 If the agency denies the claim in writing, the
plaintiff has six months to file suit under the FTCA. 49 Subject to thirteen
exceptions,50 the FTCA made the United States liable for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
of the bill, enlarging the Court of Claims' jurisdiction to "include all cases for damages not
sounding in tort," became law. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 25 n. 10.
43. Figley, supra note 8, at 1108-09.
44. Id. at 1109.
45. Brou, supra note 24, at 9-10. Congress drafted the FTCA to cover any claims arising
on or after January 1, 1945, thus enabling the victims of the crash to benefit. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(2006).
46. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, tit IV, 60 Stat. 812, 842-47 (1946) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2006)). The FTCA was passed as Title IV of the
Legislative Reorganization Act. Id. As the Supreme Court noted, "[t]he Seventy-ninth
[Congress], which passed the Act, held no relevant hearings [on the Act]. Instead, it integrated
the language of the Seventy-seventh Congress" into the Act. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 26.
47. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The agency must receive the claim within two years of the date of
accrual or the claim will be barred. Id. § 2401(b). For active-duty military members, the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act provides that the two-year statute of limitations will not
toll until completion of military service. 50 U.S.C. app. § 526 (2006). Some courts have held
that medical malpractice claims are an exception to the accrual provision of the FTCA. See, e.g.,
Wehrman v. United States, 830 F.2d 1480, 1483 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that a medical
malpractice tort claim accrues when the plaintiff knows, or should know, the existence and cause
of the injury).
49. 28 U.S.C. §2401(b).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680. Three of the thirteen exceptions are relevant to this Comment.
First, the discretionary-function exception exempts from liability "[a]ny claim based upon an act
or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care . . . or perform[ing] a
discretionary function or duty ..... Id. § 2680(a). Second, an exception for claims "arising in a
foreign country" exists. Id. § 2680(k). Finally, and most specific to service members, there is an
exception for "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces,
or the Coast Guard, during time of war." Id. § 2680(j).
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private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
51
law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
The FTCA's definition of "employee[s] of the government" includes
servicemen and women.52 Further, "'[a]cting within the scope of his office or
employment', in the case of a member of the military or naval forces of the
United States . . . means acting in [the] line of duty."53 Thus, citizens may sue
the government under the FTCA for negligent acts or omissions by service
members. Notably, the plain language of the FTCA does not preclude
members of the Armed Forces from bringing suit against the government. 54
The only exception specific to members of the Armed Forces is § 2680(j),
which bars "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military
or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war."55 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court interpreted the FTCA to bar service members' claims just a
few years after Congress passed the Act.
B. The Supreme Court Weighs in on the Application of the FTCA to Members
of the Armed Forces

Professor Henry Abraham once remarked that "[Justice Robert Jackson] was
no friend of legislative forays by judges; he was a demonstrable devot6 of
judicial restraint . . . judicial activism was for him irreconcilable with
representative democracy." 57 How then, does one explain Feres, penned by
Justice Jackson, which some critics have denounced as "willful" judicial
activism? 5 8 Despite the criticism, Justice Jackson's Feres opinion has survived

51. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). It is worth noting, however, that "[bjecause the jurisdictional
grant is for torts arising from a 'negligent or wrongful act or omission,' the FTCA does not
support claims for strict or absolute liability." Figley, supra note 8, at 1Ill (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b)).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 ('Employee of the govemment' includes .. . members of the military
or naval forces of the United States . . .
53.

Id.

54. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).
56. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950); see also infra Part I.B.
57. Henry Abraham, Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson (1892-1954) An Attempt to Place Him
into Some Historical Perspective, Remarks at the Robert H. Jackson Center (Mar. 18, 2003),
available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-articles/speeches/speeches-relatedto-robert-h-jackson/mr-justice-robert-h-jackson-1892-1954-an-attempt-to-place-him-into-somehistorical-perspective/.
58. See, e.g., Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1039 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that Feres had
"willful and arguably misguided origins"); Turley, supra note 17, at 7 ("Given the absence of
historical or legal support, the Feres doctrine appears to be the product of little more than judicial
lawmaking."). Contra The Feres Doctrine and Military Med. Malpractice: Hearing on S. 489
and H.R. 3174 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practiceand Procedure of the S. Comm. on the

Judiciary,99th Cong. 64 (1986) [hereinafter Feres Hearing] (statement of Michael F. Noone, Jr.,
Associate Dean of the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America) ("I think it is
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sixty years of judicial and congressional review. 59
1. Brooks v. United States: The Origin of the "Incidentto Service" Test

Brooks v. United States provided the Supreme Court its first opportunity to
address the application of the FTCA to military personnel. 60 A father and his
two sons were involved in a fatal accident when an Army truck, driven by a
civilian employee, collided with their car.61 One son died, and the other son
and the father were severely injured. 62 Both sons were in the Armed Forces at
the time of the accident. 63 The surviving son and the deceased son's estate
brought suit against the United States.64 The Fourth Circuit held that service
members were excluded from recovery under the FTCA, thus barring the
claim.65 The Supreme Court reversed, declaring that "[t]he statute's terms are
clear" and "[w]e are not persuaded that 'any claim' means 'any claim but that
of servicemen."' 66 Continuing with an analysis of the legislative history of the
FTCA, the Court concluded, "[i]t would be absurd to believe that Congress did
not have the servicemen in mind in 1946, when this statute was passed.67 In
important also to note, sir, that the Feres decision is really a decision involving judicial self
restraint [sic].").
59. See infra Parts II.B-C.
60. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 846 (4th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 49
(1949).
66. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51, 54. The Supreme Court's holding in Brooks that Congress did
not intend to exclude servicemen has some support from a representative who was involved in the
enactment of the FTCA. He disagreed strongly with the Fourth Circuit's conclusion before the
Supreme Court reversed it:
The opinion of the Fourth Circuit is utterly erroneous when it says that it was the
intent of Congress to exclude a member of the Armed Forces from the benefits of the
Tort Claims Act. . . . I had more to do with [the Act] than any other member. I never
intended to preclude a suit by a soldier. . . . [T]he government deliberately removes the
defense of sovereignty, except in cases where the Act specifically makes an exception.
The exception cannot be implied; it must be expressed. The court cannot read the
exceptions into law.
Note, Military Personnel and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 58 YALE L.J. 615, 621 n.26 (1949)

(quoting Representative Emmanuel Cellar, who drafted the FTCA, in an interview he gave to
Yale Law Review on November 26, 1948); see also Richard W. Kelly, Jr., Recent Decision,
Torts-Federal Torts Claims Act-Feres Doctrine-Post-DischargeFailure to Warn Theory--

Heilman v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1984), 24 DuQ. L. REV. 309,316 n.56 (1985).
67. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51. The Brooks Court noted that in the years prior to the FTCA's
enactment, several of the tort reform bills contained a military exception, but the FTCA, as
enacted, did not. Id at 51-52. The Court believed that the exclusion of a military exception was
intentional. Id.
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response to the government's contention that allowing the suit would have
"dire consequences" for the United States,68 the Court was careful to highlight
that the cause of action was not "incident to the Brooks' service." 69 Such a
situation, the Court explained, would present a "wholly different case."70
Thus, under Brooks, the FTCA allowed suits by members of the Armed Forces
if (1) the facts of the case did not fall under any of the FTCA exceptions, and
(2) the service member was off duty, off base, and the injury did not occur in
relation to his military service.71
2. Feres v. United States: A JudiciallyCreatedException to the FTCA

Only a year after the Brooks decision, the Court read an exception for
servicemen into the FTCA when it decided Feres v. United States.72 The Feres
opinion combined three separate cases on appeal under its name.7 Feres v.
United States, a Second Circuit case, involved a widow who brought suit
against the United States for her husband's death in a barracks fire at Pine
Camp, New York.74 She alleged negligence in the maintenance of the heating
plant at the barracks and in the failure to keep a proper fire watch. 76 The
In
district court dismissed her action, and the Second Circuit affirmed.
Jefferson v. United States, 7 after the plaintiff was discharged from the Army,
doctors discovered a thirty-inch by eighteen-inch towel marked "Medical
Department U.S. Army" inside his stomach during an operation.78 Jefferson
68.

Id at 52.

69. Id.
70. Id. Although the Supreme Court in Brooks asserted that the language of the FTCA was
clear, it managed to expand the FTCA by distinguishing the Brooks' situation from that which
would be "incident to service." See Turley, supra note 17, at 8-9. The FTCA is subject to an
exception for "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces,
or the Coast Guard, during time of war." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006); see supra note 50. Beyond
this specific characterization of military activity, the FTCA does not mention any other obstacle
that military personnel must overcome to bring suit under the Act and contains no language
referencing activity "incident to service." See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680. One may
question why, then, the Brooks Court made this distinction, when the "most obvious
interpretation of the FTCA [would be] to confine the exemption to combat injuries." Turley,
supra note 17, at 9.
71. See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51-52.
72. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
73. Id. at 136-37.
74. Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1949), aff'd, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
75. Feres,340 U.S. at 136-37.
76. Id The district court dismissed the complaint based on the holding in Brooks, and the
Second Circuit affirmed: "If more than the pension system had been contemplated to recompense
soldiers engaged in military service we think that Congress would not have left such relief to be
implied from the general terms of the Tort Claims Act, but would have specifically provided for
it." Feres, 177 F.2d at 537.
77. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom. Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
78. Feres, 340 U.S. at 137.
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alleged that an Army surgeon had negli ently left the towel inside of him
during an operation eight months earlier.
The district court dismissed the
case after trial,so and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 8' Griggs v. United States, a
Tenth Circuit case, also involved a widow who sued the government for the
death of her husband, alleging negligence by Army surgeons. 8 2 The trial court
similarly dismissed the case, but the Tenth Circuit reversed.
Justice Jackson began Feres where Brooks left off, declaring that it was the
"wholly different case" foreseen in Brooks.84 The issue before the Feres Court
was whether the FTCA applied to injuries to servicemen incident to their
service. For three reasons discussed below, the Court found that it did not. 86
First, the Court found that service members could not meet the test for
allowable claims because the Act required the United States to be liable "in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances."8 7 The Court reasoned that private individuals do not have the
"power to conscript or mobilize a private army with such authorities over
persons as the Government vests in echelons of command."88 Additionally, the
Court found "no American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover
for negligence, against either his superior officers or the Government."89 The
Court concluded that these factual dissimilarities between a private individual
and the government meant that Con ress intended to exempt military
personnel from the benefits of the FTCA.
79. Id
80. Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706, 708, 716 (D. Md. 1948), af'd, 178 F.2d 518
(4th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The district court
judge dismissed the case, holding that the FTCA was not intended to extend to service-connected
injuries of members of the Armed Forces. Id at 714. Around the same time, the Supreme Court
decided Brooks. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 49 (1949).
81. Jefferson, 178 F.2d at 520. The Fourth Circuit, likewise, found it "unreasonable" to
conclude that Congress intended the FTCA to apply to injuries incurred by service members in
the performance of their military duties. Id.
82. Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1949), rev'dsub nom. Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
83. Id. at 2-3. Under Feres, "[a] motion to dismiss . .. is treated as a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction." Schnitzer v. Harvey, 389 F.3d 200, 202 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
The district court in Griggs sustained a motion to dismiss the complaint because it believed no
relief could be granted under the FTCA. Griggs, 178 F.2d at 2. The Tenth Circuit, however,
relied heavily on the Brooks case, and "fail[ing] to find anything in the context of the Act or its
legislative history justifying judicial limitation upon the claims of serviceman," it reversed the
district court. Id. at 3.
84. Feres,340 U.S. at 138.
85.

Id.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at
at
at
at
at

141-46.
141 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006)).
141-42.
141.
142.
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Second, the Court noted that the relationship between members of the
Armed Forces and the United States was "distinctively federal in character." 91
Service members are stationed throuqhout the country (and the world) and
Hence, their presence in a particular
often must move from state to state.
state is more the consequence of their military orders rather than the outcome
of their choice. 9 3 Under the FTCA, the "law of the place where the act or
omission occurred" governs the liability, 94 and "claim[s] arising in a foreign
country" are exempted. 95 The Supreme Court did not believe that Congress
intended to subject members of the Armed Forces to the diverse tort laws of
the random states where they were assigned when they were injured incident to
service.96 Thus, the Court used the lack of uniformity in state laws as an
additional factor to bar all claims by service members under the FTCA.97
The final reason the Supreme Court offered to support its belief that the
FTCA was not intended to extend to suits by service members was the
comprehensive system of veterans' benefits and compensation already
available to military personnel and their families. 98 To the Court, Congress
could not have purposely anticipated collateral recovery by service members
under the FTCA when they were already protected by such an extensive
statutory scheme of benefits and compensation.99 Based on this framework,
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 143.
See id.
See id.

94.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006).
Id. § 2680(k).

95.
96.

Feres, 340 U.S. at 143; see infra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing the lex

loci delicti implications in the Rodriguez Act).
97. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
98. Id. at 145-46. The Court found the compensation system "compare[d] extremely
favorably with those provided by most workmen's compensation statutes." Id. at 145. The

Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) established the United States government's
workmen's compensation program for federal civilian employees. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8152
(2006). The majority of workers in the United States, however, are subject to the workmen's
compensation programs of individual states. See generally Workers' Compensation-Rules and
Statutes by State, http://www.workerscompensation.com/stateregs.php (last visited Sept. 27,
2010) (listing the workers' compensation statutes and rules by state). Though the programs vary
from state to state, most states' statutes, like the FECA and Military Claims Act, see infra Part IlI,
limit the available damages, but the tradeoff is that employees do not have to prove fault in order
to recover for their injuries. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN.,
LAB. & EMPL. § 9-501 (LexisNexis 2008); N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 10 (McKinney 2005 &
Supp. 2010); 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 431 (West 2002). Service members actually have broader
coverage under the military system of compensation and benefits than do federal employees
under FECA. Under FECA, federal employees may recover only for injuries sustained while
performing work. 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a). In contrast, service members may recover for injuries as
long as they were sustained while the service member was engaged in lawful activity. 38 U.S.C.
§ 1110 (2006).
99. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144. But Representative Emmanuel Cellers, who worked on the
FTCA, would have disagreed with the Court's conclusion: "Despite the fact that [servicemen]
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the Supreme Court announced what would become the notorious Feres
Doctrine: "We conclude that the Government is not liable under the [FTCA]
for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service."' 0 0
3. The World of Military Tort Claims After Feres

Just four years after Feres, the Supreme Court added considerations of
military discipline to the reasons why Congress could not have intended for the
FTCA to apply to service-related injuries of members of the Armed Forces.' 0
In United States v. Brown, the plaintiff sued for malpractice after a knee
surgery at a veterans hospital left him permanently injured.102 The Brown
Court narrowed Feres by holding that veterans no longer on active duty could
bring suit under the FTCA.' 03 To the Court, the interest that the Feres
Doctrine protected was "[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to
his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the
extreme results that might obtain if suits under the [FTCA] were allowed for
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military
duty."l04 The Court reasoned that, because former members of the military
posed no threat to the institution of military discipline, they were free to sue.los
Accordingly, the "military discipline" rationale was invented, essentially
shielding the Feres Doctrine behind what would become an impenetrable
cloud of judicial deference to discretionary military decisions.' 06
Both Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States0 7 and Chappell v.

Wallace 08 advanced the concept of protecting military discipline. Stencel was

might have various and sundry remedies for compensation, pensions, hospitalization, preferences,
etc., these benefits had nothing whatsoever to do with, and are utterly unrelated to the right to sue
under the [FTCA]." Note, supra note 66, at 621 n.26.
100. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
101. See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. I10, 112 (1954).
102. Id. at I10-11. The veteran was honorably discharged from active-duty service seven
years earlier. Id at I10.
103. Id.at 112-13.
104. Id.at 112.
105. Id The Supreme Court recognized the importance of public and judicial deference to
considerations of military discipline as far back as 1890:
An army is not a deliberative body. It is the executive arm. Its law is that of
obedience. No question can be left open as to the right to command in the officer, or
the duty of obedience in the soldier. . . . So, unless there be in the nature of things some
inherent vice in the existence of the relation, or natural wrong in the manner in which it
was established, public policy requires that it should not be disturbed.
In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 109-21.
107. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
108. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983).
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a third-party (non-military) indemnification case.109 Chappell involved a claim
by sailors against the government for constitutional torts.o10 The Supreme
Court barred these suits because "[t]he need for special regulations in relation
to military discipline" requires civilian courts to "at the very least, hesitate long
before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established
relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers."
Thus, the Supreme Court extended the Feres Doctrine to bar third-party
indemnification claims and certain constitutional claims from suit.
Thirty-five years after the Supreme Court announced Feres, the Court
formally stated its preference for the military discipline rationale as the "best"
explanation for the doctrine in United States v. Shearer.112 Reviewing

109. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 667. Stencel was a products liability case arising against the
manufacturer of an ejection seat that malfunctioned and caused the plaintiff, a Missouri Air
National Guard pilot, multiple injuries. Id. at 667 & n.1. Stencel, the manufacturer, sought
indemnification from the United States. Id. at 668. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its reasoning
in Feres and Brown and held that Feres limited the right of a third party to recover in an
indemnity action under the FTCA against the United States when the injured party was a
serviceman. Id at 671. To the Supreme Court, it made no difference who brought the lawsuit;
because a service member was injured in a service-related incident, Stencel's indemnity action
against the United States could still negatively impact military discipline. Id. at 673.
110. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 297. In Chappell, five sailors accused their superior officers of
violating their constitutional rights. Id. Although the Chappell claim did not arise under the
FTCA, the Supreme Court concluded that Feres principles applied and barred the enlisted men's
claims. Id at 299, 305. The Court relied partially on the Feres Doctrine's "military discipline"
rationale, concluding that to allow these claims would negatively impact "the need for
unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted
personnel." Id. at 304.
The plaintiffs in Chappell sought non-statutory damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents ofFederalBureau ofNarcotics. Id. at 297. In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that in the

absence of a federal statutory remedy there is an implied private cause of action for monetary
damages for violations of constitutional rights by federal employees. Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971); id at 399 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
111. Chappell,462 U.S. at 300.
112. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374
U.S. 150, 162 (1963)). The Court rejected two of its original rationales for barring suit by
members of the Armed Forces: the existence of non-uniform state tort laws and the existence of
the veterans' benefits and compensation system. Id. at 58 n.4. These justifications were
considered "no longer controlling." Id.
Shearer was an Army private who was kidnapped and murdered by another Army private,
Andrew Heard, who previously was jailed for manslaughter during an earlier tour of duty. Id at
53-54. Shearer's estate alleged that the government was negligent in failing to control the
murderer and for failing to warn others about Heard's dangerous nature. Id The Court stated
that "[t]o permit this type of suit would mean that commanding officers would have to stand
prepared to convince a civilian court of the wisdom of a wide range of military and disciplinary
decisions." Id. at 58.
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"professional military judgments" was considered outside the competence of
the Court and outside the intentions of Congress when it passed the FTCA.113
Soon after Shearer, in United States v. Johnson, the Supreme Court applied

the military-discipline rationale to bar a claim by a widow for the death of her
husband in a helicopter crash.1 14 Lieutenant Commander Horton Johnson, a
helicopter pilot in the United States Coast Guard, fatally crashed into the side
of a mountain while on a rescue mission in Hawaii.'
When the helicopter
crashed, civilian FAA controllers were in positive control of its radar.116 After
summarizing the three broad rationales behind Feres,'"7 the Court determined
that despite the civilian status of the FAA controllers, "the potential that this
suit [w]ould implicate military discipline [was] substantial."' Finding further
113. Id at 58-59 (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 302). The Supreme Court's holding here
further expanded the Feres Doctrine by allowing a command decision, not incident to service, to
change the requirements of a successful Brooks claim. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
Despite the fact that Shearer's murder occurred off-base, off-duty, and not in relation to military
service, the Supreme Court held that "the situs of the murder is not nearly as important as whether
the suit requires the civilian court to second-guess military decisions and whether the suit might
impair essential military discipline." Shearer,473 U.S. at 57 (internal citations omitted).
114. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 682-83, 691-92 (1987). The Court also
reestablished favor with the two rationales it had found were no longer controlling in Shearer,
though it emphasized the military-discipline concerns. See id at 688-91.
115. Id at 682-83.
116. Id. at 683. Essentially, the inclement weather had rendered visual control of the
helicopter impossible. The pilot requested assistance from the FAA. The FAA controller in
Honolulu used the helicopter's radar signal to locate the helicopter and then guided the pilot
through the severe weather straight into a mountain. See Brief for the Respondent at 3, United
States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987) (No. 85-2039).
117. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 688-91. First, because the relationship between the serviceman
and the government is distinctly federal in character, "it 'makes no sense to permit the fortuity of
the situs of the alleged negligence to affect the liability of the Government to [the] serviceman.'"
Id at 689 (quoting Stencel, Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977)).
Second, the existing veterans benefits and compensation system is the "upper limit of liability for
the Government as to service-connected injuries." Id. at 690 (quoting Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673).
Finally, the claim should be barred because it is "the 'type of claim[] that, if generally permitted,
would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and
effectiveness.' Id. (quoting Shearer,473 U.S. at 59).
118. Id at 692. Indeed, the status of the tortfeasors provided the central question to the case:
did their civilian status (as members of the FAA) preclude the application of the Feres Doctrine?
No, according to the Supreme Court. See id at 686-88. Though the Feres opinion twice
mentioned the military status of the tortfeasors, see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138, 143
(1950), the broad language of the opinion advanced the federal government's immunity from suit
by military personnel. Id at 144 ("We know of no American law which ever has permitted a
soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers or the Government he is
serving." (emphasis added)). The Court determined that military discipline was still at stake:
"[M]ilitary discipline involves not only obedience to orders, but more generally duty and loyalty
to one's service and to one's country. Suits brought by service members against the Government
... could undermine the commitment essential to effective service and thus have the potential to
disrupt military discipline . . . ." Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691. This reversed the findings of the
Eleventh Circuit, which held that there was "absolutely no hint ... that the conduct of any alleged
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that Johnson's widow was already receiving statutory compensation, the
Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case.119
Johnson-the last case in which the Supreme Court examined the boundaries
of the Feres Doctrine 20-therefore extended the military discipline rationale
to include civilian negligence.121

tortfeasor even remotely connected to the military will be scrutinized if this case proceeds to
trial," and thus, that Feres did not bar the claim. Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530, 1539
(11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
119. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691-92.
120. See id at 681. But cf United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671-72 (1987). Stanely
barred suit by a former soldier who, without his knowledge or consent, had been administered the
hallucinogenic drug LSD during a series of secret government tests while he was still on active
duty. Alleging substantial psychological and personal injury, Stanley brought suit under the
FTCA and Bivens. Id. He attempted to distinguish his case from Chappell, arguing first that
concern for military discipline was inapplicable because the people administering the LSD were
not his superior officers and, second, that there was no proof that his injury occurred incident to
his service. Id. at 679-80. The FTCA claim was dismissed quickly due to a procedural
deficiency related to jurisdiction in the lower court. Id. at 676-78. The majority of the opinion
focused on the merits of the Bivens claim in the context of the Chappell precedent. See id. at
678-86. Reaffirming Chappell, the Supreme Court held, just one month after Johnson, that "no
Bivens remedy is available for injuries that 'arise out of . . . activity incident to service"' and
denied Stanley his requested relief. Id. at 684 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 146). Interestingly,
Justice Scalia authored the opinion. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. "Stanley is
significant because it sanctioned a straightforward application of the incident to service test,
without resort to the rationales enunciated in Feres." Brou, supra note 24, at 24 (internal citation
omitted).
121. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 686-88. A glance at the Court's Feres jurisprudence shows that
veterans and dependants of service members may sue the United States in tort for personal injury,
but active-duty military personnel generally may not. The Brooks "incident to service" test is still
good law; however, in practice, "incident to service" generally means "active duty" status, and
therefore most claims by service members are barred. See Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535,
537 (2d Cir. 1949) ("The only exception to this interpretation of the statute which seems to have
been recognized by the Supreme Court in the Brooks case applied to situations where military
personnel were not on active duty."). The Supreme Court has relied on three rationales for
holding that service men and women may not bring suit against the government under the FTCA
for claims arising incident to their service. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 688-71. First, "the relationship
between the Government and members of the armed forces is 'distinctively federal in character,"'
and thus exposure to random state tort laws is unfair to military personnel. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143
(quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947)); see also Johnson, 481
U.S. at 689. Second, there already exists an expansive statutory system of compensation and
benefits available to service members such that relief under the FTCA would be duplicative and
could not have been intended by Congress. See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 689-90. Finally, and most
compellingly, to allow active-duty military personnel to sue the United States would disrupt the
ancient and essential convention of military discipline and command discretion-a disruption
whose review is considered utterly outside the competence of the judiciary. Shearer,473 U.S. at
59.
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4. Justice Scalia's Johnson Dissent: The Feres Doctrineas "Unauthorized
Rationalization Gone Wrong" 22

Despite its sometimes fractured status on other issues, 123 the Supreme Court,
throughout the lifespan of the Feres Doctrine, has stood fairly united behind it.
Only Justice Antonin Scalia (joined by Justices William J. Brennan, Thurgood
Marshall, and John Paul Stevens) ever mounted an assault against the
principles of the doctrine.124 The attack came in a derisive dissent in Johnson.
Justice Scalia emphasized the plain meaning of the FTCA, noting that the
Feres Doctrine is a judicially created exception to the Act, one that Congress
"not only failed to provide . . . but quite plainly excluded."l 2 5 His dissent
systematically destroyed the various rationales the majority used to sustain the
doctrine.126 For Justice Scalia, if he could not overturn Feres (because the
respondent did not request such relief), he preferred to "leave bad enough
alone" rather than to extend the doctrine to bar service members from relief
based on the negligence of civilians.1 27
122. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. For a statistical breakdown of how the Supreme Court Justices voted in each term since
1995, see Supreme Court Statistics, SCOTUSWIKl, http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php?title
=SupremeCourtStatistics (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
124. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 692-703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 692.
126. See id. at 692-700. For example, Justice Scalia noted that the "distinctively federal"
relationship between the government and service members originally focused on the unfairness of
the applicability of random tort laws to the service member, while subsequent judicial
interpretations focused instead on the military's need for uniformity: "[t]he unfairness to
servicemen of geographically varied recovery is, to speak bluntly, an absurd justification, given
that, as we have pointed out in another context, nonuniform recovery cannot possibly be worse
than (what Feres provides) uniform nonrecovery." Id at 695-96 (citing United States v. Muniz,
374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963); Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-43). Further, Justice Scalia noted that the
"parallel private liability" and "veterans' benefits and compensation" justifications were "no
longer controlling." Id. at 694-95, 697 (citing Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58 n.4). Additionally, he
stressed that the Court had made clear that "because 'Congress had given no indication that it
made the right to compensation [under the Veterans Benefits Act] the veteran's exclusive remedy,
... the receipt of disability payments ... did not preclude recovery under the Tort Claims Act."'
Id at 698 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 113 (1954)). As far as the
military-discipline rationale was concerned, Justice Scalia noted that the other justifications for
the Feres Doctrine "are so frail that it is hardly surprising that we have repeatedly cited the laterconceived-of 'military discipline' rationale as the 'best' explanation for that decision." Id at
698-99 (citing Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57). But, he noted, "[iut is strange that Congress' 'obvious'
intention to preclude Feres suits because of their effect on military discipline was discerned
neither by the Feres Court nor by the Congress that enacted the FTCA (which felt it necessary
expressly to exclude recovery for combat injuries)." Id at 699.
127. Id at 703. The unfairness of the judicially created Feres Doctrine seemed to weigh
heavily on Justice Scalia:
Had Lieutenant Commander Johnson been piloting a commercial helicopter when he
crashed into the side of a mountain, his widow and children could have sued and
recovered for their loss. But because Johnson devoted his life to serving in his
country's Armed Forces, the Court today limits his family to a fraction of the recovery
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C. The Rodriguez Act and Its Predecessors

Interestingly, at the very beginning of the Feres opinion, Justice Jackson
offered a disclaimer for what the Court was about to publish. Acknowledging
that the Court had little material before it to understand congressional intent on
the matter, he stated, "no conclusion can be above challenge, but if we
misinterpret the Act, at least Congress possesses a ready remedy."l28 Congress
has never remedied Feres, which suggests it either accepted the Court's
reasoning in 1950 and the expansive Feres jurisprudence that followed, or that
it was never able to a ree upon an appropriate remedy in response to calls to
amend the Doctrine.1 9 Despite Feres's endurance, there have been many
legislative challenges to it over the years.
1. Legislative Attempts to Limit Feres over the Last Thirty Years

In the summer of 1986, the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedure held a hearing on proposed legislation that would amend the
FTCA to allow military personnel to sue for medical malpractice.13 0 At the
hearing, Senator Charles Grassley reflected on the quandary presented in
limiting the Feres Doctrine: "I must say that I find this to be an extremely
difficult and troubling issue. Difficult, because any easy legislative response
raises thorny legal questions and potentially unlimited governmental liability.
Troubling, because we're faced with instances of great personal tragedy,
caused by government neglect."' 31 Weighing these two options, Congress has
historically avoided the uncertainty of opening the Federal Reserve to tort
claims by members of the Armed Forces.
In 1985, Congress attempted to limit Feres by introducing House Bill 3174
and Senate Bill 489.132 The House of Representatives passed House Bill 3174
in October 1985, but Senate Bill 489 stalled and the Ninety-Ninth Congress
they might otherwise have received. If our imposition of that sacrifice bore the
legitimacy of having been prescribed by the people's elected representatives, it would
(insofar as we are permitted to inquire into such things) be just. But it has not been,
and it is not.
Id

128.
129.

Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
Professor Turley has stated
One of the great ironies of the past few decades is that the conditions of military life
have been a constant political issue for both parties while the Feres Doctrine has
magnified inequities for service members. Most politicians have adopted the standard
line that they want what is best for our men and women in uniform. When it comes to
the legal rights and treatment of service members, however, Congress is manifestly
absent without leave.
Turley, supra note 17, at 70.
130. Feres Hearing, supra note 58, at 1-2 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman).
131. Id at 2.
132. Id. at 12-14 (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser). The bills were sponsored by Representative
Dan Glickman from Kansas and Senator Jim Sasser from Tennessee, respectively. Id. at 13-14.
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adjourned before the legislation was ever passed.13 Congress introduced
similar bills again in 1987,13 1991,135 2001,136 and 2008,
but each bill
ultimately failed to pass.1 38 The bills shared essentially the same purpose: to
amend the FTCA explicitly to allow medical-malpractice claims against the
government by military personnel.139 The justifications for and against passing
each piece of proposed legislation were also similar.140
133. See Greenhouse, supra note 26 ("The bill . . . passed the House in the last Congress by a
large bipartisan majority of 317 to 90. In the Senate, it never got out of the Judiciary Committee
because of the strong opposition of Senator Strom Thurmond ... the committee's chairman.").
134. H.R. 1054, 100th Cong. (1987); S. 347, 100th Cong. (1987).
135. H.R. 3407, 102d Cong. (1991).
136. H.R. 2684, 107th Cong. (2001).
137. H.R. 6093, 110th Cong. (2008).
138. It is worth noting that historically, Democrats have been the main advocates in Congress
for amending the FTCA to allow lawsuits by members of the Armed Forces. For example,
Democratic Senators Edward Kennedy and Jim Sasser, and Representatives Daniel Glickman,
Barney Frank, and Maurice Hinchey have each supported one or more of the above-mentioned
bills. See supra notes 134-37. One explanation for their support of such lawsuit-friendly
litigation is the dividends it pays with respect to the plaintiffs bar. The American Association for
Justice (AAJ) (formerly the Association of Trial Lawyers of America) is one of the country's
most generous group contributors to Democratic political campaigns. Plaintiff Bar Gone Too
Far, FOUNDATION FOR FAIR CIVIL JUSTICE, http://www.foundationforfairciviljustice.org/issues/

plaintiffs-bar/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2010) ("The [A]ssociation favors Democrats, who oppose
most attempts to initiate tort reform."); see also Editorial, No Special Tax Cutsfor Wealthy Trial
Lawyers, WASH. EXAMINER, July 15, 2010, at 2 ("[T]his tax change could be the most odious

favor yet to this overwhelmingly Democratic donor group . . . ."); Opinion, A Bill Lerach Tax
Cut, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2010, at A16 ("Taxes are going up in January for millions of
Americans, but that means it's even more important to have friends in Washington. And nobody
has friends in higher places than the plaintiffs bar."); Kimberly A. Strassel, Tort Tribute: How
Democrats Repay the Plaintiffs Bar, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2007, at A16 (calling the trial bar

"huge [Democratic] campaign bankrollers" and noting that "[a] Democratic Congress means far
more regulation, and any new regulation is an opportunity to insert a line or two giving the tort
bar greater rights to sue"); John O'Brien, Sources: Trial Lawyers Expect Tax Break from
Treasury Department, LEGAL NEWSLINE (July

13, 2010), http://www.legalnewsline.com

/news/227944-sources-trial-lawyers-expect-tax-break-from-treasury-department
(reporting that
the AAJ recently revealed it is expecting a tax break on contingency-fee litigation to the proposed
legislation introduced in Congress in 2009 by Senator Arlen Specter, a Democrat from
Pennsylvania).
139. See supra notes 134-37. Conscious of resistance to what may be perceived as doubledipping in the government's pocketbook, drafters of the legislation often limited recovery.
Frequently, the bills proposed to amend the FTCA for this purpose deducted from the amount
recoverable in the lawsuit the amount the service member would receive from disability
compensation and veterans' benefits. House Bill 2684 from the 107th Congress, for example,
included a provision in the proposed amendment to the FTCA stating that
[t]he payment of any claim of a member of the Armed Forces under this section shall
be reduced by the present value of other benefits received by the member and the
member's estate, survivors, and beneficiaries . . . that are attributable to the physical
injury or death from which the claim arose.
H.R. 2684, 107th Cong. § 2681(d) (2001).
140.

See infra Parts II.A-B.
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2. The Rodriguez Act of 2009

Marine Sergeant Carmelo Rodriguez died of melanoma in 2007, allegedly
due to malpractice by military doctors.141 In 2009, Representative Maurice
Hinchey and Senator Charles Schumer, both from New York, introduced
House Bill 1478 and Senate Bill 1347,142 respectively, to amend the FTCA to
141.

Rodriguez Hearing, supra note 28, at 116.

Carmelo Rodriguez, a fit, 190-pound

occasional actor and artist, enlisted in the United States Marine Corps in 1997. Id.; Byron Pitts, A
Question of Care: Military Malpractice?, CBSNEWS.COM (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.cbs

In his entrance physical, the
news.com/stories/2008/01/3 1/eveningnews/main3776580.shtml.
presence of melanoma on his right buttocks was noted in his medical record; however, the doctor
did not inform Sergeant Rodriguez of the potentially cancerous tumor and did not recommend
follow-up testing or treatment. Rodriguez Hearing,supra note 28, at 116; Pitts, supra. Sergeant
Rodriguez marked "no" on a medical-history report question about cancer in March of 2000
because he was unaware of his diagnosis. Rodriguez Hearing, supra note 28, at 116. Eight years
later, while Sergeant Rodriguez was deployed to Iraq, he complained of the sore to a military
doctor who recommended that they see each other again when Sergeant Rodriguez returned to the
United States. Id Five months later, Sergeant Rodriguez returned home from Iraq and visited the
same doctor, who recommended that he get the "so-called birthmark removed for cosmetic
purposes." Id. After five months and several failed referrals to military doctors, Sergeant
Rodriguez made an appointment without a referral; the "birthmark" had been "bleeding and
pussing" the entire time. Id Soon after this appointment, doctors informed Sergeant Rodriguez
that he had stage-three malignant melanoma. Id. The cancer had spread throughout his entire
body; chemotherapy and three surgeries proved futile in saving his life. Id at 117. At twentynine years old, Sergeant Rodriguez died in November 2007, an eighty-pound sickly, skeletal
shadow of his former self. Id. at 116-17; see also Pitts, supra.
A cancer misdiagnosis was also at issue in Hamilton v. United States. In Hamilton, an activeduty serviceman's cancerous tumor was negligently misdiagnosed as a skin lesion. Hamilton v.
United States, 564 F. Supp. 1146, 1147 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 719 F.2d 1 (1983). Several years after
his discharge he died, following a correct diagnosis. Id His widow's claim of misdiagnosis and
inadequate treatment was barred by Feres. Id. at 1147, 1149.
142. Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 1478, 111th
Cong. (2009); Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, S. 1347, 111th
Cong. (2009). The full text of House Bill 1478 (which is, as amended, identical to Senate Bill
1347) reads:
A Bill
To amend chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, to allow members of the Armed
Forces to sue the United States for damages for certain injuries caused by improper
medical care, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1.SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability
Act of 2009".
SEC. 2. ALLOWANCE OF CLAIMS BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES FOR CERTAIN INJURIES CAUSED BY
IMPROPER MEDICAL CARE.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
§2681. Certain claims by members of the Armed Forces of the United States
(a) A claim may be brought against the United States under this chapter for damages
relating to the personal injury or death of a member of the Armed Forces of the United
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allow for service members to bring medical-malpractice claims against the
military. 143 There are some notable provisions in House Bill 1478 and Senate
Bill 1347 that were not included in prior bills. One is the separate and specific
provision that claims under this amendment "shall not be reduced by the
amount of any benefit received under . . . Servicemembers Group Life

Insurance."l 44 Another is the provision allowing causes of action that might
arise in a foreign country. 145 Although there are some noteworthy technical
differences between the Rodriguez Act and its predecessors, in scope and
States arising out of a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the performance of
medical, dental, or related health care functions (including clinical studies and
investigations) that is provided by a person acting within the scope of the office or
employment of that person by or at the direction of Government of the United States,
whether inside or outside the United States.
(b) A claim under this section shall not be reduced by the amount of any benefit
received under subchapter Ill (relating to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance) of
chapter 19 of title 38.
(c) This section does not apply to any claim arising out of the combatant activities of
the Armed Forces during time of armed conflict.
(d) For purposes of claims brought under this section(1) subsections (j) and (k) of section 2680 do not apply; and
(2) in the case of an act or omission occurring outside the United States, the 'law
of the place where the act or omission occurred' shall be deemed to be the law of the
place of domicile of the plaintiff.
(e) As used in this section, the term 'a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the
performance of medical, dental, or related health care functions (including clinical
studies and investigations)' has the same meaning given that term for purposes of
section 1089(e) of title 10.
(b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.-The table of sections for chapter
171 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
"2681. Certain claims by members of the Armed Forces of the United States."
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by this section shall apply with
respect to a claim arising on or after January 1, 1997, and any period of limitation that

applies to such a claim arising before the date of enactment of this Act shall begin to
run on the date of that enactment.
H.R. 1478; S. 1347.
143. Press Release, Maurice Hinchey, Representative, Hinchey Unveils Bill to Reverse
Military Medical Malpractice Injustice (May 19, 2008), available at http://www.house.gov
/hinchey/newsroom/press_2008/051908MilitaryMedicalMalpracticeBilllntro.html; Press Release,
Charles Schumer, U.S. Senator Schumer: Our Men and Women in Uniform Should Not Be
Denied Restitution if They Are the Victims of Negligence by Government Doctors (June 24,
2009),
available at http://schumer.senate.gov/newwebsite/record jrint.cfm?id=314997.
Representative Hinchey introduced an identical bill, H.R. 6093, also titled the "Carmelo
Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act," in 20b8, which was referred to the House
Committee on the Judiciary in May of 2008, but a vote on this bill was never held. HR. 6093Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2008, OPEN CONGRESS (May 20,
2008), http://www.opencongress.org/bill/ll 0-h6093/show.
144. H.R. 1478, 111th Cong. § 268 1(b) (2009); S. 1347 § 268 1(b) 11lth Cong. (2009). This
is the exception to the provision that reduces compensation available under this legislation by
other veterans' benefits.
145. H.R. 1478 § 2681(d)(1); S. 1347 § 2681(d)(1).
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purpose, the Rodriguez Act is substantially similar to prior legislative attempts
to partially repeal the Feres Doctrine.
II. THE FERES BATTLEFIELD
A. Arguments SupportingLegislative Reform by PartiallyRepealing Feres
1. Fairness

In general, the proponents of allowing military medical malpractice claims
have centered their arguments on basic principles of fairness. They claim the
Feres Doctrine makes service members second-class citizens, 14 or in the
words of a prominent Feres detractor, "discount citizens." 4 7 According to
some estimates, active-duty service members make up only about one-third of
The other two-thirds are
the patients treated at military hospitals.148
dependants and retirees, who are eligible to sue the government for malpractice
under the FTCA. 149 On this level, critics argue that there exists an inequity in
denying active-duty personnel the right to sue when everyone else serviced at a
military hospital may sue if the need arises. 50 Additionally, the Supreme
146.

Feres Hearing,supra note 58, at 17 (statement of Rep. Daniel Glickman); Greenhouse,

supra note 26 (quoting Senator Jim Sasser); see also Rodriguez Hearing,supra note 28, at 167

(statement of Stephen A. Saltzburg, Professor, The George Washington University Law School).
147.

Jonathan Turley, The Feres Doctrine: What Soldiers Really Need Are Lawyers

(Aug. 18, 2007), http://jonathanturley.org/2007/08/18/the-feres-doctrine-what-soldiers-reallyneed-are-lawyers/#comments.
148. 134 CONG. REC. 1593 (1988) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
149. Id (statement of Reps. William J. Hughes and Barney Frank).
150. Id (statement of Rep. Frank). Representative Frank argued
[W]e do not think it is fair to say we will have one right for every citizen of the United
States except members of the armed services who are on active duty, that anybody else,
prison inmates, private citizens, Federal employees, retirees, they can use the [FTCA],
but no procedure [in tort] at all will be available to those who serve in the armed
services.
Id. But should members of the military be treated the same as every other citizen of the United
States? George Washington famously said, "[w]hen we assumed the Soldier, we did not lay aside
the Citizen." Letter from General George Washington, Commander of Continental Forces, to the
New York Legislature (June 26, 1775), available at http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroom
Since
materials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/amrev/contarny/newyork.html.
1890, however, the Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between civilians and members of
the Armed Forces: "By enlistment the citizen becomes a soldier. His relations to the State and the
public are changed. He acquires a new status, with correlative rights and duties . . . ." In re
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 152 (1890). Eighty-four years later, the Supreme Court noted the
"significant differences between military law and civilian law and between the military
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752 (1974).
community and the civilian community."
Commenting on the "different relationship of the Government to members of the military," the
Court stated:
[U]nlike the civilian situation, the Government is often employer, landlord, provisioner,
and lawgiver rolled into one. That relationship also reflects the different purposes of
the two communities .

. .

. [T]he military 'is the executive arm' whose 'law is that of
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Court in Brooks rebuffed the government's assertion that the language of the
FTCA was intended to exclude servicemen; 1 Feres reaffirmed Brooks.15 As
courts have expanded the Feres Doctrine, however, the practical effect has
been that Feres stands for what Brooks (which is still good law) rejected: the
FTCA essentially bars tort claims by active-duty military personnel.15 3
2. Allowing Suits Would Improve Military Medical Care

Proponents of amending the FTCA to limit the Feres Doctrine also argue
that allowing military members to sue the government for medical malpractice
will improve military medical care, which is often perceived as substandard.1 54
obedience.' While members of the military community enjoy many of the same rights
and bear many of the same burdens as do members of the civilian community, within
the military community there is simply not the same autonomy as there is in the larger
civilian community.
Id at 751 (quoting Grimley, 137 U.S. at 153).
Cases like Parkerare relevant in the context of Feres jurisprudence. The ParkerCourt noted
that when it comes to constitutional protections, "the different character of the military
community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections. The
fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline,
may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible
outside it." Id. at 758. The Court's recognition of the unique status of the service member within
the government-citizen relationship explains its deference to military-command discretion and the
caution incumbent upon courts during judicial review of military decisions. When Congress
attempts to address the issue of the government's responsibilities to its service members, that
special status, so long recognized, must necessarily color the debate. Thus, to begin an argument
decrying how military members are treated differently from every other citizen misses the point,
for members of the military are unavoidably different from every other citizen within the
framework of the government-citizen relationship.
151.

See supra note 67.

152. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (distinguishing the facts in Brooks
from those in Feres).
153. Brou, supra note 24, at 40 ("The Feres doctrine has amounted to an almost total bar to
service members' claims."); cf VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL § 3.1.4.1 (Barton F. Stichman &
Ronald B. Abrams eds., 2009) ("The VA and the courts have long interpreted the 'in line of duty'
[requirement to receive compensation under 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131] to cover literally anything
that occurred during the period beginning with induction into military service and ending with
discharge from military service."). The expansive application of the Feres Doctrine has produced
"bizarre results," further demonstrating its unfairness. Turley, supra note 17, at 28. In Kohn v.
United States, for example, the Second Circuit barred a lawsuit brought by parents to recover for
their son's death, but it allowed them to sue for emotional distress on their own behalf Kohn v.
United States, 680 F.2d 922, 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 760 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985).
Professor Jonathan Turley called non-sequiturs such as these that stem from the Feres Doctrine's
broad treatment "confused, inequitable, [and] counterintuitive." Turley, supra note 17, at 28.
154. Much of the debate on the House and Senate floors as well as in congressional
committee hearings focused on the quality of medical care within the military. See, e.g., 131
CONG. REc. 3028 (1985) (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser). After reviewing several audits of
military hospitals and medical records, the senator found that "serious problems exist at military
medical facilities that need to be corrected." Id. In the senator's view, the problem was not that
there were not appropriate regulations in place for safeguarding patients, but rather, that those
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As Senator Sasser stated, "[t]he white light of the courtroom would expose for
all to see any problems in our military medical system," and thus drive the
government to improve its standard of medical care.
3. The Current Compensation System Is Inadequate

The final justification that proponents of limiting Feres offer is that the
system of compensation and benefits available to military personnel for injury
is not adequate.156 Representative Glickman offered the story of the young
active-duty service woman who, as the result of malpractice during a surgery,
was left infertile.157 She received less than $100 per month as compensation
for no longer being able to bear children.' 58 Representative Glickman's
argument implied that although it was difficult to calculate how much money
would compensate for such a loss, $1200 per year was certainly inadequate,

regulations were not being enforced. Id; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF
DEF., EVALUATION REPORT: DOD IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA
BANK GUIDELINES (1998), available at http://www.DODig.mil/Audit/reports/fy98/98-168.pdf
(showing continued problems in military reporting of healthcare providers involved in adverse
malpractice payments); Philip M. Boffey, Defects Reported in Military Care, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 1985, at Al (detailing "serious deficiencies in appointing and evaluating doctors" in the
military); Daniel H. Johnson, Jr., After Walter Reed: How to Fix Military Medicine, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wml388.cfm (discussing
ways to improve military medicine on the premise that the system is flawed and "Congress must
move quickly to fix [it]").
155. Feres Hearing, supra note 58, at 13 (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser). Senator Sasser
believed that "the Feres doctrine was being used as a shield by some in military medicine. They
were hiding behind the Feres doctrine to prevent complete military medicine investigations." Id.
at 12-13.
156. Proponents of partially repealing Feres argue that if service members were permitted to
bring lawsuits against the government, their recovery would better compensate for their actual
injuries than the system of uniform compensation that is available to service members now. See,
e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (1987) (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("[T]he morale of
Lieutenant Commander Johnson's comrades-in-arms will not likely be boosted by news that his
widow and children will receive only a fraction of the amount they might have recovered had [the
Feres Doctrine not barred the lawsuit]."). To learn what compensation is available for veterans,
visit the Department of Veterans Affairs website. United States Department of Veterans Affairs,
Benefits include education,
http://www.vba.va.gov/VBA (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
compensation and pension, vocational rehabilitation, home loans, survivor's benefits, and life
insurance, among others. Id; see VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 153, §§ 3.1-3.3
(discussing compensation for service-related injuries).
157. 134 CONG. REC. 1597 (1988) (statement of Rep. Daniel Glickman).
158. Id.; see also Greenhouse, supra note 26 (noting that the woman received sixty-six
dollars per month in disability pay).
159. 134 CONG. REC. 1597. Another case that was frequently cited by Congress was that of a
twenty-two year old sailor who went to the hospital on his birthday to have a cyst removed from
his arm. Feres Hearing, supra note 58, at 15 (statement of Rep. Daniel Glickman). As a result of
malpractice, the sailor was left severely brain-damaged and became a quadriplegic requiring
continuous care. Id. The compensation he receives from the government is $600 to $800 less
each month than what his twenty-four-hour care costs. Id
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and she would likely recover much more money if she were allowed to bring a
successful case under the FTCA.160
B. Arguments OpposingLegislative Reform of the Feres Doctrine
1. Fairness

Supporters of the Feres Doctrine,161 just like their opponents, also focus
their arguments on the concept of fairness; specifically, the unfairness in
limiting proposed legislation only to medical or malpractice claims.162 The
General Counsel for the Department of Defense (DOD) rejected this
approach.163 The DOD argued that fairness demanded the maintenance of the
existing system of compensation, rather than "creating a special class of
claimants whose rights to claim depend upon where and how they were injured
and not on the injury they suffered." 1 "
2. Allowing Suit Would Not Improve Military Medical Care

Supporters of Feres go further to argue that even if military discipline was
not affected, the cumulative proposed amendments to the FTCA would
actually do very little, if anything, to solve the problems for which they were

160. See 134 CONG. REC. 1597.
161. The supporters are usually the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense.
See 134 CONG. REC. 1593.
162. When asked why the bills excluded other forms of negligence claims, Senator Sasser
and Representative Glickman replied that it was a matter of assumption of the risk. Feres
Hearing, supra note 58, at 19 (statement of Rep. Daniel Glickman). From this perspective,
injuries that arose out of negligence during the regular course of a serviceman's employment
were distinct from injuries at the hands of a doctor because in the former case, the serviceman
assumed the risk and in the latter he did not. Id. (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser and Rep. Daniel
Glickman). Under the FTCA, the United States can assert any defenses that would be available to
the federal employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim under the law of the state
where the injury occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006). Assumption of risk, therefore, could be
included in the available defenses.
In contrast, Representative Frank argued that this narrow medical malpractice exception to the
Feres Doctrine would prevent "imping[ing] on command decisions ... [o]nce you get out of that
fixed medical facility where you have voluntarily gone in and there is a doctor there . . . you get
into very difficult questions of command discretion." 134 CONG. REC. 1595 (statement of Rep.
Barney Frank).
163. Mr. Garrett, the General Counsel for the DOD, argued that
If a soldier loses a leg on field maneuvers, on the base in a driving accident, or in the
hospital at the hands of a surgeon, he or she has the same injury. To provide special
dispensation for one medical injury while denying it for another equally painful and
debilitating loss will not promote either the appearance or the reality of fairness.
Feres Hearing, supra note 58, at 41 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett, General Counsel,
Department of Defense).
164. Id

170
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drafted. 1s They argue that allowing members of the Armed Forces to sue the
government for medical malpractice will have no effect on improving military
This is because the government would be the entity that is sued
medicine.'
and forced to pay the damages awarded in the lawsuits, not the doctors.167
Thus, deterrence based on the concept as it exists in the civilian world of tort
liability is inapplicable.1 6 8 Therefore, Feres supporters argue, this system does
little to prevent military medical malpractice. 1 6
3. The Current CompensationSystem Is Adequate

Finally, supporters of the Feres Doctrine argue that the compensation system
available to service members is wholly adequate and fair, and even more
generous than what is available to the general public. 170 This contention stems
from the fact that military members are compensated for their injuries without
having to prove fault. 171 A military person who sustains an injury will receive

165. See, e.g., id at 51 ("[The] 'deterrence' theory is suspect for two reasons . . . . the
punitive feature of tort law was expressly made inapplicable to the United States in the FTCA
[and] when malpractice claims are filed against military physicians, they are immunized from
suit ..... ").
166. Id; see also id. at 64 (statement of Michael F. Noone, Jr., Associate Dean of the
Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America) (arguing that passage of the Small
Tort Claims Act of 1927, which waived sovereign immunity for government automobile
accidents, did nothing to improve the driving habits of government drivers, so it is unlikely that
waiving sovereign immunity for military medical malpractice will improve military health care).
167. Id. at 51 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett, General Counsel, Department of Defense);
see Military Medical Malpractice Act of 1976, 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (2006) (granting immunity from
individual liability to military medical personnel).
168. See Feres Hearing, supra note 58, at 51 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett, General
Counsel, Department of Defense) ("[T]he traditional purpose of tort law in our jurisprudence has
been to compensate, and to make whole. The punitive feature of tort law expressly was made
inapplicable to the United States in the FTCA itself.").
169. Id Incongruously, the government usually follows this argument first with a denial that
military medicine is substandard to civilian medicine and then with an explanation of the
measures currently being taken to improve the system. See id.
170. The Feres Doctrine: An Examination of this Military Exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 3 (2002) [hereinafter

Examination Hearing] (statement of Paul Harris, Deputy Associate Att'y Gen., Department of
Justice) ("[T]he Feres doctrine is an adjunct to the military disability compensation package
available to service members which, on the whole, is far more generous, even-handed, and fair
than compensation available to private citizens under analogous State worker's compensation
schemes .... ).
171. Feres Hearing,supra note 58, at 31 (statement of Robert L. Willmore, Department of
Justice) ("While ... the compensation may be somewhat less than what might be available [to a
successful plaintiff in] a medical malpractice lawsuit . . . the fact is that all . . . servicemen are
eligible for . . . compensation rather than only a small handful who . . . can show a causal link

between their condition and substandard medical care.").
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compensation for it.172 Civilians, in contrast, may be eligible to sue for their
injuries, but there is no guarantee that they will receive compensation if they
cannot prove fault on the part of the government. 73 Thus, "the arbitrariness
and uncertainty associated with tort litigation is . . . eliminated," and thus,

proponents claim, the military system of compensation is fairer than what is
available to civilians.' 74
C. MilitaryCommand Discretionas the Vanguardof the Debate

Despite their opposing positions regarding the equitable merits of the Feres
Doctrine, on both sides of the argument exists a pervasive reluctance to
interfere with military decision-making. This fear of affecting command
authority is why on one hand, the legislation has been limited to medical
malpractice and not other negligence claims, and why, on the other hand,
opponents argue against any legislative reform.175 In fact, the military
discipline rationale commands the debate today.' 76
D. Inspecting the Rodriguez Act

Because the last thirty years have seen bill after bill fail to pass, one may
infer that Congress has been more persuaded by the government's argument
for leaving the Feres Doctrine alone than by the arguments presented for
partially repealing it.177 Nevertheless, the Rodriguez Act, with its adjustments
172. 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006). There are three fundamental requirements for obtaining
compensation for injuries sustained incident to service: a medical diagnosis of current disability,
incurred or aggravated during service, and a nexus between the two. Id
173. Feres Hearing, supra note 58, at 31 (statement of Robert L. Willmore, Department of
Justice).
174. Examination Hearing, supra note 170.

175. Feres Hearing, supra note 58, at 45-46 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett, General
Counsel, Department of Defense).
176. See supra Part lB. This rationale, first expressly established in Brown, has sounded the
death knell for legislation to overturn Feres for many years. According to this rationale, "the
unique nature of the military" requires a different remedy than that available to civilians. Feres
Hearing,supra note 58, at 45 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett, General Counsel, Department of
Defense). In an ironic cry for judicial restraint, courts have refused to allow tort claims by service
members under the FTCA because they maintain that doing so may second-guess the judgment of
military commanders-an undertaking that the courts believe is wholly outside their competence.
See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983). The irony is that in making this
decision, the courts reinforce and expand the Feres Doctrine, which was already a judicial
extension of the plain language of the FTCA. In any case, supporters of the Feres Doctrine
remind Congress that "the notion of military personnel suing in tort runs counter to the
accumulated wisdom and experience of all three branches of Government." Feres Hearing,supra
note 58, at 45 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett, General Counsel, Department of Defense).
177. Concern for the cost of such legislation unquestionably influenced the debates. See,
e.g., 134 CONG. REC. 1591 (1988) (statement of Rep. Robert Latta) ("While the estimated cost of
this bill is $25 million per year . . . it is very difficult to predict the cost of medical malpractice
awards. It would not surprise me if the actual cost of this legislation turned out to be a major
budget figure."). The Congressional Budget Office projects that, assuming the Rodriguez Act is
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to previously proposed legislation, could convince Congress otherwise. But
should this be the legislation to finally limit the Feres Doctrine?
1. Ramifications of the Passageof the Rodriguez Act

The Rodriguez Act's 78 technical deficiencies undermind its laudable goals.
To begin, it is unclear who exactly is "a member of the Armed Forces of the
Courts have applied the Feres Doctrine to cadets and
United States.
Did the drafters intend to include these
midshipmen,s as well as reservists.
groups within the amendment in addition to active-duty military personnel?
Secondly, both House Bill 1478 and Senate Bill 1347 prohibit claims
"arising out of the combatant activities of the Armed Forces during time of
armed conflict."l 82 How should a court interpret that clause? Traditionally,
under the FTCA, courts have interpreted the term "combatant activities" to
mean "the actual engaging in the exercise of physical force."l83 The bills
direct that section 2680(j), excepting "any claim arising out of the combatant
activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of
war," shall not apply to section 2681.184 This begs the question whether85 there
is an intended difference between "during time of armed conflict"' and
enacted within fiscal year 2010, it will cost the government $2,700,000,000 billion within the
next ten years with an average award of $450,000 to successful claimants. CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 1478 CARMELO RODRIGUEZ MILITARY MEDICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2009 2-3 (2009).
178. According to Representative Hinchey, the purpose of the Rodriguez Act is not "about
members of the military being compensated fairly for medical negligence, [but rather is] about
holding our military accountable for its actions and for its responsibility to its members."
Rodriguez Hearing, supra note 28, at 92 (statement of Rep. Maurice Hinchey). The family of
Carmelo Rodriguez added, "[w]hat service men and women and their families want and deserve
is equal protection under the law." Id at 121 (statement of Ivette Rodriguez, sister of Sergeant
Carmelo Rodriguez).
179. Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 1478, 111th
Cong. (2009); Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, S. 1347, 11Ith
Cong. (2009).
180. See, e.g., Wake v. United States, 89 F.3d 53, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a claim
based on injuries to a Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps midshipman was barred by Feres).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll, 369 F.2d 618, 620 (8th Cir. 1966) (applying the Feres
Doctrine to bar a claim made by a reservist).
182. H.R. 1478 § 2681(c); S. 1347 § 2681(c).
183. Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 372, 374 (W.D. La. 1947) ("If it had been intended
that all activities of the armed forces in furtherance or preparation for war were to be included,
the use of the words 'war activities', it seems, would have been more appropriate, but instead, the
exception or exemption from liability for torts was restricted to 'combat activities,' which as
indicated by the definitions, means the actual engaging in the exercise of physical force.").
184. H.R. 1478 § 2681(d)(1); S. 1347 § 2681(d)(1); see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006).
185. The Geneva Conventions established the phrase "armed conflict," a term of art in the
law of war; it refers either to an international armed conflict between states or an internal armed
conflict, such as a civil disturbance. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field arts. 2-3, openedfor signature
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 32.
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"during time of war."1 86 Legal and historical precedent hold that armed
conflict is a necessary but not sufficient element of war.'8 7 Therefore, the most
plausible reading of the provision is that the drafters of the Rodriguez Act
intended to expand the number of situations in which a service member could
be barred from suing under the FTCA.' 88 The practical effect, then, would be
to limit the Feres Doctrine by allowing medical malpractice claims against the
government, while at the same time expanding the situations that would bar
such claims under the FTCA-an effect that appears facially incongruous.
Representative Hinchey indicated that the armed conflict clause was intended
to incorporate
situation[s] [that are] very difficult and very dangerous, and the
medical attention that has to be given there has to be immediate, and
it has to be in ways that are designed to save the life of that person.
And it is a very dramatic and very, very strong action that has to be
taken on behalf of those who are injured or wounded, whatever the
circumstances might be.1 89
Believing the implication in Representative Hinchey's remarks to be broader
than the traditional understanding of combatant engagement, a retired general
said, "[I]t seems to encompass any dangerous and difficult situation requiring
immediate life saving measures . . . that could occur in locations [far] from

battle. This suggests that the nature of the medical emergency rather than the
nature of the external circumstances is the important factor."'190 Thus, the
language of the provision read together with Representative Hinchey's
explanation suggests yet another increase in the number of situations in which
service members could be barred from suit, which was likely not the drafters'
intention.191

186. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that the law of war is "the
body of international law governing armed conflict." Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 641
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Additionally, war is "for legal purposes ... more properly
referred to as armed conflict." HELEN DUFFY, THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (2005).

187. See United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 451-52 (D. Mass. 2008) (exploring
the definitions of "war," and finding that they "rather emphasize the element of armed conflict").
188. This is likely an acknowledgement that in modem times, the United States is frequently
(some might argue constantly) engaged in armed conflict, but not technically at war. For
example, "[t]he United States has not declared war in any conflict since World War II, despite
prolonged engagements in Korea, Vietnam, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (twice) and shorter
deployments in Panama, Grenada, Haiti, and Somalia, among others." Id. at 447.
189. Rodriguez Hearing,supra note 28, at 92 (statement of Rep. Maurice Hinchey).
190. Id. at 201 (statement of Major General (Retired) John D. Altenburg, Jr., United States
Army).
191. As General Altenburg noted, "[w]hat Representative Hinchey described is a situation
where medical judgment or ability is impaired by combat activities, which is different than
combatant activities causing injury." Id. at 196.
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In addition, this ostensibly expansive langua e, taken together with the
Rodriguez Act's allowance of overseas torts,' 9 makes it appear that the
drafters intended to allow claims arising in fixed United States military
medical centers in foreign countries where service members are often
Prior bills precluded such interpretations by restricting
deployed.193
malpractice claims to "fixed medical treatment facilit[ies] [operated by] the
United States."' 94 But if that was the drafters' intention, the language of the
Rodriguez Act is far from clear.
The overseas-tort provision raises choice-of-law concerns as well. The
FTCA commands that "the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred" 95 shall be applied in court. The Rodriguez Act deems that if a claim
arises in a foreign country, the law to be applied shall be "the law of the place
of domicile of the plaintiff."' 9 6 Many states' choice of law provisions,
however, will apply the law of the country where the tort occurred,197 which
would defeat the apparent intent of the drafters of the Act to avoid the
application of foreign law. Furthermore, the law of domicile of military
members is far from straightforward.19 8 If the Rodriguez Act passes, this
provision could provoke complicated choice-of-law analyses for the courts.
192. See Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 1478, 111 th
Cong. § 2681(d)(2) (2009); Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, S.
1347, 111 th Cong. § 2681(d)(2) (2009).
193. A common criticism of the prior proposed legislation to repeal Feres partially was the
lack of allowance of claims arising in U.S. military hospitals around the world. See, e.g., Feres
Hearing, supra note 58, at 75 (statement of Michael F. Noone, Jr., Associate Dean, Columbus
School of Law, Catholic University of America). It is thus plausible to assume, in the absence of
clear language to the contrary, that the Rodriguez Act's sponsors were attempting to address this
criticism. The language of H.R. 1478 and S. 1347, however, is ambiguous on this issue.
194. See, e.g., H.R. 2684 § 2681(b), 107th Cong. (2001).
195. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006).
196. H.R. 1478 § 2681(d)(2); S. 1347 § 2681(d)(2).
197. See Rodriguez Hearing,supra note 28, at 197-98 (statement of Major General (Retired)
John D. Altenburg, Jr., United States Army). For example, Maryland follows the lex loci delicti
rule for torts: "[W]hen an accident occurs in another state substantive rights of the parties, even
though they are domiciled in Maryland, are to be determined by the law of the state in which the
alleged tort took place." Philip Morris, Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 230 (Md. 2000). This is
true for most American jurisdictions, even if the injury occurred in a foreign country. See, e.g.,
Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563 F.3d 663, 669-70 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that even if plaintiffs
brought suit in Illinois, the law of Argentina would apply, as that country was the origin of the
injury).
198. Members of the Armed Forces are frequently compelled by military orders to relocate to
new duty stations around the country and world. This kind of constant mobility can complicate
the determination of their domiciles. But a service member's domicile will not change simply
because military orders oblige a move to a new state. See, e.g., Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46
S.W.3d 829, 849 n.17 (Tex. 2000). If the service member wishes to establish domicile at the duty
station, however, she may, if she can establish particular factors showing her residence and intent
to return there after completion of her military obligations See, e.g., Teague v. Dist. Court of the
Third Judicial Dist., 289 P.2d 331, 333 (Utah 1955) (listing elements that may help to prove a
service member's intent to change domicile). There are certain advantages for a service member
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Finally, there is no guarantee, even if the Rodriguez Act passes, that the
Feres Doctrine would not simply be supplanted by the FTCA's powerful
discretionary-function exception.l9 The FTCA prohibits "[a]ny claim . . .
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
Of
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
the thirteen enumerated exceptions to the FTCA, the discretionary function
201
In order for this exception to
exception is the broadest and most criticized.
test. 202 The first step
a
two-step
has
applied
Supreme
Court
the
be triggered,
concerns the character of the behavior and asks whether it was a judgment or a
203
A "federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescrib[ing] a
choice.
course of action for an employee to follow" is neither a judgment nor a
choice.204 The second step then questions whether the sort of judgment the
exception was intended to protect was present in the case.205 In Gaubert v.
changing her domicile: in some states, military income is exempt from state taxes; other states
have no state income tax at all. See Legal Residence/Domicile, Brooks City Base,
www.brooks.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6248 (last visited Aug. 27 2010); Legal
Residence and Domicile, www.robins.af.millshared/medialdocument/AFD-090317-037.pdf (last
visited Aug. 27, 2010) ("Taxation is often a service member's primary consideration in choosing
their domicile.").
The Rodriguez Act raises other questions related to domicile. First, should or could a service
member select her domicile after the injury, or must it be the domicile the service member had
upon entering the service? Must married service members share a joint domicile? These
questions and complications are avoided in the existing system of compensation and veterans'
benefits.
199. For an excellent analysis of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to the
discretionary-function exception to the FTCA, see Brou, supra note 24, at 61-66.
200. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
201. See, e.g., Mark C. Niles, "Nothing but Mischief': The Federal Tort Claims Act and the
Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1275, 1300 (2002) ("[W]ith the possible

exception of an express limitation on claims arising out of intentional torts, the broadest and most
consequential of the FTCA's specific shields is the so-called 'discretionary function
exception."'); James R. Levine, Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposalfor Institutional

Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1538, 1541 (2000) ("The most gaping and frequently litigated of
the FTCA's exceptions is the 'discretionary function exception."'); see also id at 1547 ("There is
wide scholarly agreement on the failings of the FTCA caused by the discretionary function
exception.").
202. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991) (affirming the two-pronged test
set out in Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988)).
203. Id. at 322.
204. Id.
205. Id at 322-23; see also United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)
("Congress wished to prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative
decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in
tort. By fashioning an exception for discretionary governmental functions, including regulatory
activities, Congress took 'steps to protect the Government from liability that would seriously
handicap efficient government operations."' (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163
(1963))).
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United States, the leading case on the discretionary-function exception, the
Supreme Court added a presumption to the second-step analysis: "[I1]f a
regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation
creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the
regulation involves consideration of the same policies which led to the
promulgation of the regulations."206 Thus, "[i]f Congress intended to protect
the conduct or if the conduct involved policy considerations, the discretionary
function exception generally bars recovery under the [FTCA]." 207 The first
prong of the two-step test seems to relieve the concern that the discretionaryfunction exception could be applied against military medical-malpractice
claims because the exception disqualifies mandatory regulations, guidelines,
and procedures from the exception.208 However, there is much in the practice
of medicine that is based on the doctor's discretion and judgment that might
not fall into one of those categories. In that case, the problem becomes that
to prevail on this prong, the plaintiff must demonstrate such a
violation. In the absence of such a violation, courts find an
employee's actions to be "discretionary in nature." Then, the
plaintiffs only chance is to demonstrate that the conduct was not
"susceptible to policy analysis" under the second prong. This is
extremely difficult . . . .

Moreover, if the first-prong analysis

indicates that a regulation actually confers discretion on a
government employee, this creates a "strong presumption" that the
second prong is satisfied. As a result, the plaintiffs ability to show a
violation of a mandatory procedure or guideline is frequently
-209
outcome-determinative.
Even so, the possibility of the discretionary-function exception
overwhelming medical-malpractice claims is slight, at best: "[T]he
discretionary function exception is intended to shield the government from
liability for the exercise of governmental discretion, not to shield the
government from claims of garden-variety medical malpractice." 210 Generally,
professional malpractice does not fall within the discretionary-function
exception's immunity.211 But it is also not explicitly precluded by the
206. Gaubert,499 U.S. at 324.
207. Brou, supra note 24, at 65-66; see also, Niles, supra note 201, at 1279 (arguing that the
Supreme Court has interpreted the FTCA "to allow for a restriction on federal tort liability that is,
in most instances, essentially identical to that applicable before the law was passed").
208. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322.
209. Levine, supranote 201, at 1542-43.
210. Sigman v. United States, 208 F.3d 760, 770 (9th Cir. 2000).
211. See, e.g., Collazo v. United States, 850 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[W]here only
professional, nongovernmental discretion is at issue, the 'discretionary function' exception does
not apply."); see also Fang v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the United States is not immune from claims related to the "actual administration of medical care
by its employees" but is immune from claims related to discretionary policy decisions involving
the allocation of medical personnel and resources); Martinez v. Maruszczak, 168 P.3d 720, 729
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exception. Under the Gaubert two-part test, government-employed physicians
serving the military would
enjoy immunity from medical malpractice liability only when their
allegedly negligent acts involve elements of judgment or choice, and
the judgment or choice made is of the kind that the discretionaryfunction exception was designed to shield, that is, a judgment or
choice involving social, economic, or political policy
-212
considerations.
Although it is likely that, in most cases, courts could not apply the
discretionary-function exception to bar service members' claims of medical
malpractice, even a slight chance of over-application is troublesome. 213
In sum, the Rodriguez Act leaves many questions unanswered, which likely
will lead to confusion in the courts if Congress passes the Act. Furthermore,
the drafters failed to consider the powerful discretionary-function exception of
the FTCA, which potentially could render the Act completely impotent.
2. Ramifications of the Rodriguez Act Failing

If the Rodriguez Act fails, then the status quo survives. The status quo,
however, seems to be increasingly less tolerant of the inequities of the Feres
214
Doctrine.
All of the existing objections to the Feres Doctrine will linger,
and the lower courts will continue their assault on it. Because of the harsh
nature of Feres jurisprudence and the heartbreaking stories that constituents
will keep raising with their congressional representatives, it is certain that
legislation proposing to overturn or limit Feres will continue to be introduced
in the halls of Congress. Allegations that the Feres Doctrine and perceived
deficiencies in medical care and compensation schemes negatively affect
morale and discipline in the military will persist. Even if the Rodriguez Act
fails, action still must be taken to rectify these concerns. As the Ninth Circuit
(Nev. 2007) (applying Nevada's FTCA-like waiver of sovereign immunity and finding that
"while a physician's diagnostic and treatment decisions involve judgment and choice, thus
satisfying the [Gaubert] test's first criterion, those decisions generally do not include policy
considerations, as required by the test's second criterion.").
212. Martinez, 168 P.3d at 722.
213. If one wonders how the slip of a surgeon's knife could possibly trigger the
discretionary-function exception, consider that the military must make decisions about training,
staffing, and equipping its medical centers. A consequence of those decisions could be a lessexperienced surgeon performing surgery while more-experienced surgeons are deployed.
Another consequence could be that money was appropriated for one command purpose over
another. Although this consideration is, admittedly, far-fetched, one should not, in light of the
expansive Feres and discretionary-function exception jurisprudence, underestimate the lengths to
which the discretionary-function exception could be stretched. See Fang, 140 F.3d at 124
(finding that the government is immune from suits regarding the allocation and deployment of
resources); see also Brou, supra note 24, at 3-4 (arguing that the Feres Doctrine has been
expanded beyond its original purpose of protecting military decision-making and discipline).
214. See supraPart II.A.
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once noted, "until Congress, the Supreme Court, or an en banc panel of this
Court reorients the [Feres] doctrine, we are bound to follow this well-worn
path."2 15
III. COUNTERATTACK: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE FERES PROBLEM
A. Alternatives to the Rodriguez Act

Despite its good intentions, the Rodriguez Act is fatally flawed. 2 16 The
Feres Doctrine could benefit from some revision, 217 which the Supreme Court
is unlikely to provide.218 These concerns suggest that legislative action is the
necessary remedy, though not in the form that the Rodriguez Act proposes.
Two prior alternatives have been proposed to remedy the problems inherent in
the Feres Doctrine, both of which are more persuasive than the Rodriguez Act.
1. Restoring the FTCA to Its OriginalFunction

In a 2007 article published in the Military Law Review, Major Deirdre Brou
proposed a solution to the FTCA-Feres problem:219 she would simply
substitute the existing exceptions to the FTCA for the "overly-broad" Feres
In particular, Major Brou argued that the FTCA's
Doctrine.220
discretionary-function exception would protect judicial interference with
military command and discipline "while also preserving service members'
rights under the [FTCA]." 221 The American Bar Association has espoused this
222
solution as well.
Although very compelling and, arguably, completely
faithful to the intent of the original drafters of the FTCA and a plain-language
reading of the statute, this recommendation fails to consider the demonstrated
over-application of the discretionary-function exception.223 It is possible that,
even if Congress were to amend the FTCA to overrule the Feres Doctrine
legislatively, the courts could apply the discretionary-function exception to

215. Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2001).
216. See supraPart lI.D.L.
217. See supraPart II.D.2.
218. See supra Part lB.
219. Brou, supra note 24, at 72 ("The Feres Doctrine protects military decision making and
discipline from ... judicial second-guessing at the expense of service members' rights under [the]
Federal Tort Claims Act. This doctrine is too broad in scope and should be supplanted by the
Federal Tort Claims Act's enumerated exceptions.").
220. Id. Major Brou emphasized the arguments expounded by Justice Scalia in his dissent in
Johnson. Id. at 73.

221. Id. at 66-67 ("Courts can apply this two-part discretionary function test to protect the
military's decision making process and its discipline.").
222. Rodriguez Hearing,supra note 28, at 212 (statement of Stephen A. Saltzburg, Professor,
The George Washington University Law School).
223. See supra Part II.D. 1 (discussing the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA).
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achieve the same undesired results.224 Taken toether with the Rodriguez Act,
But allowing the FTCA's
this would not be an overarching concern.
discretionary-function exception to stand alone is far more worrisome, given
the expansive treatment it has received in the courts. 226
2. Amending the Military Claims Act

In his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedure in 1986, Dean Michael Noone proposed a different solution to
the FTCA-Feres problem. 227 In his view, military victims of injuries sustained
incident to service could be compensated adequately using the Military Claims
Act.228 As written, the Military Claims Act,229 like the Feres Doctrine, bars
injuries incident to service,230 but it could easily be amended to "permit the
adjudication of personal injury and death claims of personnel presently barred
by the Feres Doctrine." 231 A year after this testimony, the Subcommittee on
Military Personnel and Compensation held a hearing addressing the prospect

224. See Niles, supra note 201, at 1353 ("[T]he Supreme Court's current interpretation of the
[discretionary-function] exception expands the provision's limitations well beyond their intended
scope, undermining the central purpose of the provision.").
225. See supra Part II.D. I (discussing the vague possibility of the discretionary-function
exception limiting service member medical-malpractice claims).
226. See Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal
Governmental Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L. REV. 871, 871-72 (1991) ("The discretionary
function exception presents a substantial obstacle for tort claimants to surmount . . .
unquestionably preventing many of those injured from receiving compensation."); see also
Rosebush v. United States, 119 F.3d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 1997) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the court's application of the discretionary function as having "swallowed, digested, and excreted
the liability-creating sections of the [FTCA]"); Levine, supra note 201, at 1546 (arguing that
"wherever the courts draw the line between discretion and plain negligence, the 'discretion' ambit
includes many acts that would be subject to the regular negligence calculus if committed by
private defendants").
227. Feres Hearing,supra note 58, at 76-79 (statement of Michael F. Noone, Jr., Associate
Dean of the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America).
228. Id at 77-78.
229. 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (2006). The Military Claims Act provides an administrative remedy
for damage to or loss of property, personal injury, or death caused by a civilian employee or
member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard. Recovery is permitted
whether or not there is any indication of negligence or fault on the part of the military. Id. §
2733(b)(4). There are two categories of claims recognized by the Military Claims Act. First are
"those claims that involve military personnel acting within the scope of their employment";
second are "those incident to so-called 'noncombat activities.' The former . .. require negligence
before recovery is permitted, while the latter do not." Poindexter v. United States, 777 F.2d 231,
235 (5th Cir. 1985). The latter simply require a showing of causation and damages. 1 Handling
Federal Tort Claims, supra note 38, § 1.04[2][9], at 1-19. Recovery is also permitted if the claim
arises in a foreign country. 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (2006).
230. 10 U.S.C. § 2733(b)(3).
231. Feres Hearing,supra note 58, at 78 (statement of Michael F. Noone, Jr, Associate Dean
of the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America).
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of this amendment. 232 The DOD, historically a reliable proponent of the Feres
Doctrine, supported this proposal.233
The benefit of allowing the claim under the Military Claims Act, if
amended, is that the claims are adjudicated by the individual services, thus
eliminating concerns of civilian judicial interference with military-command
-234
discretion.
Additionally, the Military Claims Act already allows for claims for injuries
that arise in foreign countries, unlike the FTCA: "[F]or over [thirty] years the
Military Claims Act has been a vehicle for [the] claimants overseas who are
not barred by Feres to recover for malpractice. This is a system already in
place with a proven record for handling malpractice claims."235 Thus, the
transition to implementing a program for military members recovering from
the government for tortious injury would be more efficient under the Military
Claims Act. Unlike the Rodriguez Act, "which would increase the burdens of
an already saturated judicial system,"236 an amendment to the Military Claims
Act would build upon an already established administrative remedy that could
"readily accommodate the additional cases that would arise."237
Finally, amending the Military Claims Act to allow for injuries sustained
incident to service could provide satisfactory compensation to military victims
of government negligence. Under the Military Claims Act, the Secretary of the
applicable department may settle and pay claims up to $100,000. 238 If the
Secretary believes a claim merits compensation in excess of $100,000, the
Secretary can forward the claim to the Secretary of the Treasury so the excess
239
can be paid subject to 31 U.S.C. § 1304.

232. Compensation for Victims of Military Malpractice: Hearing Before the Military Pers.
and Comp. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 100th Cong. 1 (1987) [hereinafter

Compensation Hearing] (statement of Rep. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery).
233. Id. at 65 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett III, General Counsel, Department of
Defense) ("The Department believes that amendment of the Military Claims Act ... may very
well provide ... a solution.").
234. Feres Hearing,supra note 58, at 77 (statement of Michael F. Noone, Jr., Associate Dean
of the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America). The Military Claims Act also
precludes judicial review of Department action. See 10 U.S.C. § 2733(g) ("A decision of the
officer or employee who makes a final settlement decision under this section may be appealed by
the claimant to the Secretary concerned or an officer or employee designated by the Secretary for
that purpose."). Additionally, the Military Claims Act, which functions much like the FTCA,
does not contain a discretionary-function exception like the FTCA, so there does not exist the
corresponding concern of the exception defeating the legitimate claims of service members. See
10 U.S.C. § 2733.
235. Compensation Hearing, supra note 232, at 66 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett Ill,
General Counsel, Department of Defense).
236. Id. at 87.
237.

Id.

238.
239.

10 U.S.C. § 2733(a).
Id. § 2733(d).
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Congress has not addressed the possibility of amending the Military Claims
Act for this purpose since the 1980s. But the inequities of the Feres
jurisprudence have persisted, making legislative action necessary; thus, this
solution should be revisited. Amending the Military Claims Act is the best
compromise to concerns raised by Feres's supporters and its detractors. It
provides a simple vehicle to provide compensation for service members
injured incident to their service while addressing the necessary balance of
military discipline and discretion.
B. ProposedAmendment to the Military Claims Act

Section (b) of the Military Claims Act currently reads: A claim may be
allowed under subsection (a) only if-

. . . (3) it is not for personal injury or

death of such a member or civilian officer or employee whose injury or death
is incident to his service. 240 In order to achieve the goal of allowing military
personnel to file claims against the government for injuries sustained incident
to service, this section should be amended by simply deleting provision
(b)(3 ).241
IV. CONCLUSION

Like private citizens, members of the Armed Forces have sometimes
suffered substantial injury at the hands of the government. Unlike private
citizens, service members are precluded from suing the government because of
the extensive and widely criticized Feres Doctrine, a judicially created
240. Id. § 2733(b)(3).
241. A proposed amendment to the Military Claims Act could read:
A BILL
To Amend chapter 163 of title 10, United States Code, to allowing claims by members of the
Armed Forces for injuries incurred incident to their service.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Military Claims Act of 2009".
SEC. 2. ALLOWANCE OF CLAIMS BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, FOR
INJURIES INCURRED INCIDENT TO THEIR SERVICE.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Chapter 163 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by deleting
PROPERTY LOSS; PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH: INCIDENT TO
§ 2733(b) (3): §2733.
NONCOMBATANT ACTIVITIES OF DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, NAVY, OR AIR FORCE
"(b) (3) it is not for personal injury or death of such a member or civilian officer or employee
whose injury or death is incident to his service."
(b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.-The table of sections for chapter 163 of
title 10, United States Code, is amended by renumbering (b)(4) and (b)(5) to (b)(3) and (b)(4),
respectively, and by adjusting the language of § 2733 to the following:
"§2733. Property loss; personal injury or death."
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made to this section shall apply with respect to a
claim arising on or after January 1, 2009, and any period of limitation that applies to such a claim
arising before the date of enactment of this Act shall begin to run on the date of that enactment."
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exception to the FTCA that has survived sixty years of congressional review,
despite near-universal agreement that some form of modification is required.
Unfortunately, the Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of
2009 is a partial and inadequate attempt at solving the problems raised by the
Feres Doctrine. This legislation is ineffective and inequitable. Rather than
combating unfairness with unfairness, Congress should amend the Military
Claims Act to allow tort claims by members of the Armed Forces for injuries
incurred incident to their service, without limiting those injuries to medical and
dental malpractice claims. Such an action may, once and for all, defeat the
inequities of the controversial Feres Doctrine, but not at the expense of
military discipline and command discretion-the overriding justifications in
barring service members' claims against the government under the FTCA.

